Bassam Gergi

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On June 28, 2018, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) voted in an open meeting on several final rules and rule proposals that will have a material impact on the Commission’s whistleblower program. Most notably, the SEC approved a rule proposal that would modify its Rule 21F, which defines who is a whistleblower and establishes anti-retaliation protection, to comport with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).

As detailed on our blog, in February, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that the anti-retaliation provision of the Dodd-Frank Act only applies to individuals who have provided information regarding a violation of the securities laws to the SEC. In so holding, the Court ruled that the SEC’s Rule 21F-2, which enabled an individual to gain anti-retaliation protection from complaints not made directly to the SEC (such as internal company complaints), was in clear contravention of Congress’s instruction that a “whistleblower” is a person who provides “information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”

The SEC’s proposed rule will comport with the Court’s holding by requiring, inter alia, that an individual seeking anti-retaliation protection report, in writing, information about possible securities laws violations to the SEC itself. The proposed rule would apply uniformly: to the SEC’s whistleblower award program, the heightened confidentiality program, as well as for employment anti-retaliation protection.

On February 22, 2018, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment against Plaintiff who claimed that his employment was terminated in violation of the SOX whistleblower protection provision.  The court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Plaintiff actually…

Last week, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a terminated CEO’s complaints about his board of directors’ managerial decisions did not qualify as protected whistleblowing under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) nor under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (“DFA”).  Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., No. 16-3502, 2018 WL 359814 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 2018).

Background.  Plaintiff was the founder and former CEO of a company that specializes in energy-efficient lighting.  In November 2012, following a series of disputes between Plaintiff and the company’s board of directors, Plaintiff was terminated for incurable cause.  A year and a half after his termination, Plaintiff brought a lawsuit that alleged that he was retaliated against, in violation of SOX and DFA, for his complaints to various board members about the company’s business practices.  Practices about which Plaintiff alleged to have complained included attorney over-billing, intellectual property disputes, conflicts of interest, and violations of internal company protocol.  The Company moved for summary judgment, arguing in part that Plaintiff’s complaints did not qualify as whistleblowing entitled to protection from adverse employment actions.

Rulings.  Chief Judge Griesbach granted the Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s SOX and DFA claims.  Chief Judge Griesbach held (1) that SOX protects complaints about securities fraud, not “run-of-the-mill corporate problems,” which is what he believed Plaintiff raised here, and (2) that Plaintiff’s complaints to various board members about what he thought they should be doing did not amount to whistleblowing, because “[s]imply telling a person he might be committing fraud is not whistleblowing” and “airing concerns is not whistleblowing.”  Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., No. 14-CV-352, 2016 WL 4507317 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2016).

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, holding that “[a]n executive who advises board members to disclose a fact that the board already knows about has not ‘provide[d] information’ about fraud.  At most, he has provided an opinion.”  Verfuerth­ No. 16-3502, 2018 WL 359814 at *4.  The Court emphasized that nothing in SOX, or any other federal statute, prevents a company from firing its executives over differences of opinion.